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Public and Private: Neither Deep nor 
Meaningful? 
William Lucy and Alexander Williams
* 
… to some faint meaning make pretence …1 
Visionaries and philosophers are often prone to grandiose statements. Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
declarations that God was both dead and our longest lie are among the most grandiose.
2
 
While such claims have almost no equivalents in the pragmatic discipline and practice of law, 
this certainly does not guarantee that we lawyers work and think free from questionable, 
mystifying and outmoded beliefs. One such belief is the idea that there is a single and deeply 
significant distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ that lawyers have struggled – and are 
currently struggling – to unearth. Being lawyers, we are almost occupationally unable to 
make any grandiose claim, not least the one that this belief in the significance of ‘the’ 
public/private distinction is one of our longest lies. Our argument is instead that this belief 
requires substantial amendment. This is because there are many distinctions between public 
and private, not one; and because the various versions of that distinction operative in law are 
almost never doctrinally dispositive. We unpack these claims in the three sections that follow. 
It should, however, be noted at the outset that in denying that ‘the’ public/private distinction 
is deeply significant we are not affirming that it is insignificant. Our claim is that lawyers are 
prone to exaggerate its importance, to regard it as more fundamental and determinative than it 
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  John Dryden, Mac Flecknoe (London: D Green, 1682), I.1. 
2
  See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Bernard Williams (ed.), Josefine Nauckhoff (trans.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), paras. 108, 125, 343, 344.  
really is. It is no more significant than the legion of complex and multiform concepts – like 
reasonableness, intention, causation etc – that lawyers interpret, apply and contest every day.   
1 Not One but Many 
The claim that there is not one but many versions of the public/private distinction can be 
disaggregated into two principal components.
3
 The first holds that there is no single version 
of the public/private distinction operative in law and life but a number;the second insists that 
some legal versions of the distinction  operate either  practically (in particular cases) or 
juristically (in legal thought, teaching and commentary). We attempt to unpack and 
substantiate both components in this section and the next. In this section, we elucidate five 
versions of the public/private distinction, each of which is worth separating because, when 
                                                 
3
  That this claim is something of a platitude in the social sciences and humanities is evident from S. Benn and 
G. Gaus (eds.), Public and Private in Social Life (London: Croom Helm, 1983); B. Moore, Jr., Privacy (New 
York: ME Sharp, 1984); J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1989); J. Weintaub and K. Kumar (eds.), Public and Private in Thought and Practice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997); M. P. d’Entreves and U. Vogel (eds.), Public and Private: Legal, 
Political and Philosophical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2000); R. Geuss, Public Goods, Private 
Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Peter Cane is one of the few jurists to grasp this feature 
of the ‘the’ public/private distinction in the legal context: see Peter Cane, ‘Public and Private Law: A Study 
in the Analysis and Use of a Legal Concept’, in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell (eds.), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence: Third Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Peter Cane, ‘Accountability and the 
Public/Private Distinction’, in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-layered 
Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). On the propriety of extending the claim to the juristic realm, 
see William Lucy, ‘Private and Public: Some Banalities about a Platitude’, in C. Mac Amhlaigh, C. 
Michelon and N. Walker (eds.) After Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), ch. 2, s. II. Section III of 
that chapter overlaps with s. I of this chapter and we are grateful to the editors and publisher of that volume 
for permission to use that material here.    
taken together, they accommodate many apparently contradictory intuitions about ‘the’ 
public/private distinction. These intuitions inform the sense many lawyers have, when 
grappling with questions of public and private, of hitting an impasse or falling into a 
quagmire. This sense reduces once we appreciate that our apparently conflicting intuitions 
embody some or many of the following different distinctions between public and private and 
is further alleviated by noting two other related points. First, that there is a degree of 
permeability between the versions of the public/private distinction such that attempts to 
delineate one version can be affected, both positively and negatively, by delineations of other 
versions of the distinction. Second, different versions of the public/private distinction can 
play different roles within our thought and practice. This issue – dubbed, for want of a better 
term, ‘methodological’ – and the permeability of the boundaries between the various versions 
of the distinction are the fulcrum of section II. That different versions of the distinction can 
function in three quite different ways – within legal discourse, external to it and 
simultaneously internal and external to it – adds to the complexity of our thought about 
public and private.But it does not show that that distinction is either deeply meaningful or 
completely dispositive in legal disputes. Section III addresses the latter point by examining 
the role one version of the public/private distinction played in some relatively recent cases. 
We argue that, in these cases the role played by the distinction was not dispositive and that 
this point should not be regarded as news. It is, rather, a banality with which we lawyers are 
completely familiar, although sometimes prone to forget.      
The order of treatment begins with the broadest versions of the distinction 
(those that apply to all or many social domains) and concludes with a fairly 
narrow version (which applies to only one social domain).4 This expository 
strategy is adopted in part as a cue for the issues explored in sections II 
and III.1.The first way of distinguishing public and private is by contrasting matters of 
general concern with matters of individual concern. The idea that issues of general, 
communal concern exist independently of those matters of concern to individuals qua 
individuals had a vivid life in the Roman republic. Matters of general communal concern 
and ownership were originally marked by the term res publica which, in one sense, was 
used to highlight the property and interests of the Roman army. That term came to be 
used in a more general sense, to include matters of concern to the community of Roman 
citizens in general, including their interest in various public spaces (the Forum etc).
5
 Yet 
the term is seemingly always contrasted with those matters of concern only to individuals 
as individuals rather than individuals qua members of sub-groups within the community. 
The latter restriction is in need of justification, since the assumption that, when defining 
the realm of the private, ‘individual concern’ must mean ‘single individual concern’ (and 
not the concern of a collection of individuals) is just that: an assumption.  
This assumption makes it impossible for groups of individuals (incorporated or 
unincorporated, but smaller than everyone or the vast majority) to join together in their 
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  By ‘social domains’ we have in mind nothing more precise than the discernibly different sets of institutions, 
practices, rules and expectations that constitute social reality. 
5
  For an admirably clear and brief discussion of these issues, see Geuss, Public Goods, ch. 3. The Greeks, it 
seems, did not view these matters in the same way: for an interesting discussion of fourth century Athenian 
thought see Moore, Privacy, ch. 2; A. Saxonhouse, ‘The Classical Greek Conceptions of Public and Private’, 
in Benn and Gaus (eds.), Public and Private, ch. 15, provides a broader but no less interesting survey.      
concern over some matter and remain private.
6
 But there is no obvious and strong reason why 
we should not regard the interest a group of individuals has in some matter as private, 
provided this group is a sub-group of some larger group. The contrast between public and 
private in this context is therefore one between all, on the one hand, and many, some or few, 
on the other. Where the group of individuals with some or other interest is identical with all 
the members of the only grouping in play, then it seems proper to characterise their interest 
not as private but as ‘the’ public interest. The absence of hard and fast rules of usage here 
also allows another twist: we might, quite properly, regard the interests of a group larger than 
a mere handful of people as representing the public interest in some circumstances. So, for 
example, it is not crazy to say that the public interest in some community would be served by 
the construction of a bridge across a river or a busy road, even when that community is small 
and when far fewer than all members will use the bridge. This scenario could also be 
justifiably characterised as an instance of private interest- where that means something more 
than ‘single individual concern’ but less than ‘the concern of each and every member of the 
group’.     
Bearing in mind these leeways of usage, a plausible interpretation of this version of the 
distinction between public and private can take alternate form. The two terms could be used 
to contrast matters of relevance and interest to the whole or the vast majority of a community, 
on the one hand, with matters which are of relevance and interest to either individuals taken 
                                                 
6
  This seems to have been James Harrington’s view: ‘the people, taken apart, are but so many private interests, 
but if you take them together they are the public interest’: J. Harrington and J. Toland, The Oceana and 
Other Works of James Harrington (London: A Millar, 1656, 1700), pp. 154-5. For Quentin Skinner, this is 
an expression of the neo-roman view that the will of the people is nothing more than ‘the sum of the wills of 
each individual citizen’: Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 28-9.    
singly or to sub-groups of individuals (parents, occupants of a particular locale etc), on the 
other. The contrast here is between almost all (public) and some (private), rather than 
between many and one. Alternatively, the terms public and private could be used to 
characterise either the interests of all, or the interests of any but the very smallest group, on 
one hand, and the interests of individuals qua individuals, on the other. The contrast here is 
between the related many (public) and the unrelated few (private).
7
 Since usage licenses both 
characterisations, a case should be made for preferring one over the other. No such case made 
is made here, however, since our argument requires only that these different uses be brought 
to light.    
This variability of usage, and the way in which it permits lines to be drawn slightly 
differently in one and the same context, is evident in the deliberations of the English courts 
when determining the charitable status of a trust. One test that any trust must satisfy in order 
to be regarded as charitable in English law is that it be of public benefit.
8
 The courts 
distinguish between sufficiently and insufficiently public groups for this purpose in ways that 
make use of each alternative formulation of this version of the public/private distinction. 
Thus it has been held that a trust can be of public benefit even if it benefits only a small 
number of people in a particular locality. The ‘public’ here is therefore envisaged as a very 
small, small or medium sized group of individuals with an interest in common; it must, 
however, be more than just ‘private individuals’ or ‘a fluctuating body of private 
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  We do not claim that the quantifiers (‘almost all’, ‘many’, ‘some’, ‘few’) in these two formulations are 
ultimately logically robust; we hold only that they have some intuitive and serviceable ‘everyday sense’.  
8
  Charities Act 2006, s. 2(1)(b) and s. 3. The case law on public benefit prior to the Act is still valid by virtue 
of s. 3(3) of the Act. The Charity Commission’s guidance on the nature of public benefit has recently been 
found wanting: The Independent Schools Council v. The Charity Commission [2011] UKUT 421 
individuals’. 9  Furthermore, even a very large number of individuals, such as 110,000 
employees of a large multi-national company, may not be enough to constitute the public.
10
 
What marks the line between a sufficiently and insufficiently ‘public’ group is thus not 
immediately obvious. It is something the courts struggle with and, viewed generously, is 
clearly a matter of judgment.  
In the exercise of this judgment, the courts have concluded that trusts for the benefit of 
numerically very small groups, such as elderly Presbyterians or the occupants of a particular 
old persons’ home, benefit a sufficiently public group.11 By contrast, it seems that a trust for 
the building and maintenance of a bridge open only to impecunious Methodists would not be 
of public benefit.
12
 The former small groups are a segment of the public while the latter 
group, which could be numerically identical, is not: the distinction the courts are drawing 
here is therefore not one between the very many (public) and the very few (private). The 
courts have also accepted that trusts for the giving of public masses in a particular church and 
for the benefit of a specific synagogue are of public benefit, one reason being that both 
church and synagogue in question were open to the public at large.
13
 A trust for the benefit of 
a Carmelite order was held to be non-charitable on the ground that, inter alia, the order’s life 
had no public aspect, but was given over entirely to ‘private’ religious worship and 
meditation.
14
 It seems that the only sure-fire blocks to charitable status, when the public 
benefit requirement is in play, is the fact that the group which stands to benefit is either much 
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  Verge v. Summerville [1924] AC 496 (PC) at 499 (Lord Wrenbury). 
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  See Oppenheim v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd. [1951] AC 297 (HL) (‘Oppenheim’). 
11
  See Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association v. Attorney General [1983] Ch 159 (Ch); Re 
Neal (1966) 110 SJ 549 (Ch). 
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  Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Baddeley [1955] AC 527 (HL) at 592 (Lord Simonds) (‘Baddeley’). 
13
  See Re Hetherington (Deceased) [1990] Ch 1(Ch); Neville Estates v. Madden [1962] Ch 832 (Ch). 
14
  Gilmour v. Coats [1949] AC 426 (HL). 
too small (‘numerically negligible’15), or consists of members all or many of whom have a 
personal nexus with the benefactor(s).
16
 While the courts will sometimes regard a 
numerically negligible group as private on grounds of its size, they will also usually regard a 
numerically very significant group as private if there is a personal nexus.
17
    
The current version of the distinction, understood as marking a line either between almost all 
and some, on the one hand, or between related many and unrelated few, on the other, is not 
only significant because instantiated in this area of law. It is also significant because it 
presents a particularly vivid contrast with the second version of the distinction, examined 
below. The contrast concerns the state. While to the forefront of the second version of the 
distinction, the state is almost completely absent in the current version: it is not even a 
necessary condition of ‘public-ness’ in the latter, while in the former it assuredly is. 
However, since the state is an almost unavoidable part of contemporary societies, a version of 
the public/private distinction that does not register its presence risks being thought 
eccentric.
18
 That risk is nevertheless worth taking because the current version of the 
distinction provides both a salutary reminder about the state itself and warns of an egregious 
elision.  
The reminder is that the state was not always with us.– Which is to say, humankind has not 
always lived with an agency of power and ostensibly legitimate authority separate from a 
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  Oppenheim [1951] AC 297 at 306 (Lord Simonds).  
16
  The personal nexus limit was thoroughly explored by the House of Lords in Oppenheim, ibid.  
17
  See Baddeley [1955] AC 527 (Methodists in West Ham and Leyton too small a group to be ‘public’). 
18
  On which, see N. Bamforth, ‘The Public Law-Private Law Distinction: A Comparative and Philosophical 
Approach’, in P. Leyland and T. Woods (eds.), Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constrains and 
New Horizons (London: Blackstone Press, 1997) 136. For a recent attempt to conceptualise the state, see N. 
Barber, The Constitutional State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010). 
collective body of people, on the one hand, and a powerful and presumably charismatic 
individual or collection of individuals, on the other. The state as we know it, and as it was 
‘invented’ in modernity, is something different, in terms of its life-span, deployment of power 
and ostensible authority, from both Kings and the multitude.
19
 How this difference is to be 
conceived has been a staple of some strands of political philosophy since Thomas Hobbes 
posed the question and offered a distinctive and tremendously influential answer to it. One 
important point, for present purposes, is that we need a vocabulary to capture matters of 
public concern in those contexts, like the classical (not just Roman) world, in which the state 
as we know it seems not to have existed. 
The temptation is to read our modern notion of the state back into the historical record. 
Because we are familiar with this locus of power, distinct from personal and people power, 
we tend to assume that every one, during every epoch, was. Once we start doing this, we are 
no distance at all from the egregious elision. It consists of blurring the distinction – or simply 
assuming it out of existence – between public concerns and interests that can be conceived 
independently of the state and those public concerns and interests that unavoidably involve 
the state. The elision usually involves assuming that the latter must subsume the former, i.e. 
that anything of public or collective interest must ipso facto involve the state or be of state 
interest. This assumption must be converted into an argument and that, surely, is unlikely to 
be general. It is simply very difficult to imagine what reasons might show that every instance 
of the public interest, as conceived here, is also an instance of state interest or should involve 
the state.    
                                                 
19
  The argument belongs to Quentin Skinner: a lucid and magisterial presentation is chapter 14 of his Visions of 
Politics, volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). A shorter version is ‘The State’ in T. 
Ball, J. Farr and R. Hanson (eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
If the state is not crucial to this version of the distinction, one might well wonder what 
relevance, if any, the distinction has for law. A rearrangement of legal doctrine around the 
two poles of this distinction can be attempted. The areas of law currently regarded as 
constituting private law might be conceived as involving matters of individual concern. The 
law of contract, torts, trusts, personal and real property certainly allow individuals qua 
individuals, or as members of corporate or unincorporated bodies, to give legal effect to their 
decisions. Private law not only provides protection for a number of interests individuals have 
(in their persons and holdings, for example), but also allows future planning through 
contracts and trusts. Public law might be regarded as entailing only matters of collective 
concern, being of relevance to all or the vast majority of the community. The community’s 
constitution and rules for the deployment of force, for example, could be regarded in this 
light.   
 
There might be a problem with this attempt to inscribe this distinction in law. The distinction 
might not actually work as a general structuring principle for legal systems because it defines 
one of its poles out of existence. This worry arises once the examples mentioned in the 
previous paragraph are scrutinised. Think, again, of contract and tort, equity and trusts, 
personal and real property. While these areas of law surely protect various ‘private’ interests 
individuals have, and allow individuals to achieve various goals, is it not equally true that all 
members of the community have an interest in these areas of law functioning in those ways? 
If so, then private law, no less than public law, is a matter of public concern, an interest of, 
and of relevance to, each and every member of the community in which it exists. If all of a 
community’s law is of interest and relevance to all members of that community, then all law 
is in one sense public (law).  
The claim that a community’s law is of interest and relevance to all members of that 
community is only plausible if understood as something other than an empirical truth. The 
claim normally contains an implicit ‘ought’ as well as another restriction, for it usually 
means: all engaged members of the group ought to interest themselves in their community’s 
law. This ‘ought’ need not be a moral ought or in any sense other-directed; it can be purely 
prudential or self-interested. The weight carried by ‘engaged’ in this claim is considerable 
and it requires the support, at the very least, of an account of what group membership entails. 
In the context of the modern state this usually becomes a discussion of citizenship and its 
limits, although we should not forget that the notion of citizenship predates that of the state.  
Is it the case, then, that when deployed in the legal context this distinction actually defines 
one of its poles away?  No. For although the distinction generates a plausible and informative 
sense in which all law – public and private – is public, it also allows us to say in conjunction 
that some areas of law are more private than others. Some areas of law appear designed so as 
to facilitate and protect individuals in their pursuit of their own personal projects. This might 
seem like keeping one’s cake and eating it, but only if we assume that a distinction between 
public and private must be unique, comprehensive and dispositive. But this version of the 
distinction is clearly neither comprehensive nor dispositive, since it does not generate 
bivalent answers in every instance. It allows us, instead, to say that one and the same area of 
law is in some respects public and in other respects private. Some might regard that kind of 
judgment as sophisticated and informative, but it seems unlikely that all lawyers will agree.     
Of all versions of the public/private distinction, the current one exercises strong gravitational 
force over the second, at least as that distinction is sometimes drawn by lawyers in the 
context of administrative law. Almost all lawyers are uneasy about accepting the distinction 
as drawn in administrative law as a comprehensive and deeply significant version of the 
public/private distinction. As drawn therein, the distinction misses too much about public and 
private. This sense is plausibly explained by the hold that the current version of the 
distinction has on us. All lawyers know (or feel they know) that all law is significantly public. 
The current version of the distinction accommodates and nurtures this view. 
 
2. The second version of the distinction between public and private is often to the forefront of 
contemporary minds. It is a distinction between the public conceived as the realm of the state, 
on the one hand, and the private understood as the realm beyond or free from the state, on the 
other.
20
 This version of the public/private distinction has different applications, including a 
role in relation to the provision of goods and services, where public (state) provision is 
contrasted with private (non-state) provision, and in relation to economic regulation, where 
public (state) regulation of the economy is compared with private (non-state) regulation. The 
‘public’ pole of this version of the distinction can overlap with the public pole of the first 
version of the distinction, particularly when we move (too) quickly from ‘matter of interest to 
all or the vast majority’ to ‘matter of state interest’.   
The principal difficulty with this version of the distinction is that it cannot always yield a 
bivalent answer to the question ‘is this activity or conduct, practice or institution either public 
or private?’ This is primarily because the domain of the state and that of the non-state are 
both malleable, subject to extension, contraction and hybrid blurring. As to the latter, take the 
traditional state provision of some standard ‘public’ services, such as public transport, refuse 
collection, education and health care as examples. It is not only in the UK that these services 
                                                 
20
  S. Benn and G. Gaus, ‘The Liberal Conception of the Public and the Private’, in Benn and Gaus (eds.), 
Public and Private, pp. 50-52, provide a brief survey of instances in which this version of the distinction – or 
something very like it – has been invoked by social and political theorists. 
have relatively recently been provided by private companies through a web of genuine and 
sometimes mock-contracts with a local or central government authority.
21
 Indeed, this 
process of semi-privatisation and ‘contractualisation’ of public services is now a fairly 
common feature of many nation states. It is a process which, while undoubtedly public, is 
also significantly private.
22
 There are two quite different senses in which this process is 
public. First, it is public because the services provided are of interest and benefit to almost all 
members of the community; and, second, it is public in the sense that those services are 
funded, via various forms of taxation, by undeniable instruments of the ‘state’ (local and 
central government). It is also meaningfully private, this being most evident from the fact that 
the services in question are delivered by companies under a web of contracts which often link 
not only the funders and providers of services, but also the providers and consumers of 
services. These contracts include not just provisions relating to cost and quality but related 
requirements attempting to ensure responsiveness to consumers.  
Is this type of service provision either public or private? Posing the question in this bivalent 
form shows its foolishness. It is clearly a hybrid that does not sit entirely comfortably under 
either description but can be accommodated by both. The most natural answer to the 
question, given the way in which the service provision process has just been sketched, is 
surely: both. There are, as we have seen, useful and intelligible senses in which that process 
can be described as both public and private. Once we understand that the question ‘is X 
public or private?’ can be answered in a more-or-less, matter-of-degree way, then our 
                                                 
21
  There are many treatments of this process. One of the most interesting discussions of English developments 
is P. Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). 
22
  Indeed, the practice of contracting-out has caused the courts a great deal of classificatory difficulty in the 
administrative and human rights law contexts: see, notably, R v. Servite Houses; ex parte Goldsmith (2001) 
33 HLR 35 (QB); YL v. Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27 (‘YL’). 
understanding of ‘the’ public/private distinction might improve. For if some activity or 
conduct, practice or institution might sensibly be both private and public in a number of 
ways, then it becomes plausible not just to chart those various ways, but also to consider the 
point of mapping the distinction in each of those various ways. We might then be able to 
offer judgments like this: for the purpose of constitutional oversight and accountability, 
activity A is public but, for purpose of applying the rules of contract law, it is private. The 
temptation to view such judgments as contradictory bespeaks simple-mindedness.           
If this picture is accurate, then it in part explains why the two principal legal versions of this 
distinction between public and private (or between public and non-public) are far from 
dispositive.
23
 In England, these two versions have been developed by public lawyers in an 
effort to distinguish between the state, conceived as the government, and the proper realm of 
its activities, on the one hand, and civic society (or the non-state realm), on the other. It 
seems that both efforts to distinguish public from non-public are intended to do dispositive 
legal-doctrinal work, although as a matter of fact they rarely succeed in doing so. The two 
ostensibly different ways of formulating the public/private distinction are best labelled 
‘institutional’ and ‘functional’. 24  Elements of each appear when the courts are deciding 
whether or not some conduct or decision is subject to judicial review and/or covered by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and/or falls within the ambit of EC law.
25
 What, then, do these two 
approaches tell us? 
                                                 
23
  As will be seen in section III, our view is that there are indeed more than two versions of the distinction in 
play in this context.  
24
  We are following Cane, ‘Accountability’, p. 249.   
25
  For a helpful overview of the principal cases under each head, see C. Campbell, ‘The Nature of Power as 
Public in English Judicial Review’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 90. 
The institutional approach to determining ‘public-ness’, conceived as the domain of the state, 
is reducible to a disarmingly simple question: is the body or agent in question part of 
government? The approach is most evident in Strasbourg, where the European Court of 
Human Rights must determine under Art 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights
26
 
whether a particular body is a ‘governmental organisation’ precluded from filing Convention 
claims of its own,
27
 but it also looms large in domestic law.
28
 The functional approach is also 
reducible to a single, albeit slightly more complex question: is the process, conduct or 
decision in question one typically public or discharged by government? The first approach is 
a matter of determining where, in the social-cum-political structure, the decision-making 
body or agent is located; the second involves determining what the decision-making body or 
agent actually does. Each approach has been refined to include additional, subsidiary 
questions and tests but, even in their most refined form, each is discernibly distinct in that 
they can generate quite different answers in one and the same case. Hence the Advertising 
Standards Authority and the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers could both quite comfortably 
be regarded as public bodies on the functional approach, whereas neither could be so 
regarded on the institutional approach.
29
 
                                                 
26
  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953 (‘ECHR’). 
27
  Art 34 provides that Strasbourg ‘may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a [Convention] violation.’ 
28
  See, e.g., Holy Monasteries v. Greece (1995) 20 EHRR 1; and, for analysis of the law in this area, A. 
Williams, ‘A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998: Private 
Contractors, Rights-Stripping and “Chameleonic” Horizontal Effect’ [2011] Public Law 139 at 145-54.  
29
  R v. Datafin; ex parte Panel on Takeovers and Mergers [1987] QB 815 (CA) (‘Datafin’); R v. Advertising 
Standards Authority Limited, ex parte The Insurance Service Plc. [1990] 2 Admin LR 77 (QB). .  
That each approach can yield different answers in the same case could be regarded as 
showing that both do dispositive doctrinal work in such cases. We do not believe that this is 
always or even often so, which is  not to say that these approaches, and the various subsidiary 
tests they have spawned, do no work at all. They undoubtedly carry some weight in the 
judicial decision-making process. But why have these two approaches in particular taken 
root? As a matter of chronology, the institutional approach predated the functional approach, 
but the latter arose and has assumed prominence because of the weaknesses of the former. 
One particularly glaring weakness is that, when viewed from the perspective of the 
institutional approach, the processes of contracting out and privatisation serve to remove 
many state activities from the purview of judicial review. The functionalist approach is more 
obviously interested in the locus rather than the form of public power. Contemporary 
administrative practices and institutional forms are therefore as much grist to its mill as were 
more traditional organisational forms of state power. For current purposes, the crucial point is 
that even in this relatively limited segment of law – the component of administrative law 
concerned with judicial review – there is more than one version of the public/private 
distinction simply by virtue of there being available at least two different approaches to 
drawing that distinction. Although the two different approaches might generate the same 
answers in some cases, the fact that they can generate different answers in the one and the 
same case shows that there is more than one public/private distinction in play.  
Finally, a point that has been lurking in the shadows of the discussion in this subsection 
should be brought to light. It is that the contrast yielded by the institutional and functional 
approaches to determining ‘public-ness’ is probably not well understood as one between the 
public, on the one hand, and the private, on the other. Rather, the distinction generated seems 
to be between the public and the non-public, and the latter, of course, can include much more 
than just the realm of the private (however understood). Remember that public, in terms of 
this distinction, is a surrogate for ‘state’ and the realm of the non-state can surely include not 
just aspects of the paradigmatically private realm (what one chooses for breakfast and what 
one does with one’s earnings), but also the public realm as understood in terms of the second 
distinction (res publica etc). This is important because it can explain the disquiet often felt 
with institutional and functional approaches when taken as a means of distinguishing public 
and private. For we suspect that not all that is meaningfully public is covered by these two 
approaches and that not all they relegate to the non-public realm is meaningfully private. This 
is the point of claiming, as we did above, that the first version of the distinction exerts a 
gravitational pull over other versions, such as to create a slight but insistent disquiet with 
them.     
 
3. The third version of the distinction, like the first, warrants the judgment that there is an 
interesting and informative sense in which all law is public. The senses that ‘public’ and 
‘private’ bear here are not, however, the same as the senses they have in either of the 
previous two versions of the distinction. The distinction between public and private as drawn 
here is altogether more technical and, while not as obvious in either law or the general culture 
as the first and second versions, it nevertheless captures and conveys an important insight. 
The distinction has been drawn principally by economists and consists of distinguishing 
between public and private goods. Pure public goods, on this view, are non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous. A good is non-excludable if, once available, beneficiaries cannot be prevented 
from using it. The light from lighthouses has this property since, once lighthouses are 
functional, seafarers cannot be prevented from benefiting from their light: it is available for 
all to see. The light from lighthouses is also non-rivalrous, which means that its use by some 
does nothing to reduce its availability to others. This is clearly not true of many other goods, 
such as cake and apples, which are excludable and rivalrous. Such goods are quintessential 
private goods. 
One key property of pure public goods – non-excludability – shows the difficulty in 
providing such goods. How might lighthouses and their attendant light be provided and 
maintained? An obvious path would be to seek contributions from all who will and do benefit 
from them. A consensual levy upon seafarers is a natural consequence, but purely self-
interested seafarers have reason to avoid such a levy and to free-ride. Once light is provided, 
its non-excludability means that it is provided to all who stand to benefit from it whether or 
not they have contributed to its provision. An allegedly rational A rational but purely self-
interested individual seafarer will therefore conclude that it is better for them to benefit from 
the good without paying for it, rather than benefit from the good and pay for it. So, too, will 
all other allegedly rational but purely self-interested seafarers. Yet if this is so, the free-rider 
problem not only arises after provision of the good, as in our hypothetical; it will also prevent 
any pure public good being provided in the first place, if a sufficient number of potential 
beneficiaries asked for a contribution are rational and purely self-interested. They will 
conclude that it is better not to contribute and take the benefit if and when the good is 
provided by contributions from the rest. All economists and rational choice theorists accept 
that coercion is a standard solution to free-rider problems, particularly in the form of power to 
compel the beneficiaries of public goods to contribute towards their provision and upkeep. 
Many economists and rational choice theorists therefore conclude that the state, in the form of 
an organised monopoly of legitimate force, is the best or perhaps even the only way of 
ensuring the provision of public goods.
30
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While the argument just sketched takes as its example the light from lighthouses, the view of 
some influential economists is that it works equally well with regard to law.
31
 They think this 
despite the fact that law, unlike the light from lighthouses, is an impure public good at best 
and that much is often subsumed under the rubric ‘law’. Nevertheless, if their claim is that all 
law is a public good, that provokes a number of questions. First and foremost is this: all law? 
This question arises because ‘law’, when used in the claim that all law is a public good, 
includes not just the substantive law structured by traditional juristic divisions but also (i) the 
idea of the rule of law and its components; (ii) the fundamental constitutional compact that is 
the basis of any polity; and (iii) the notion of security (or lawfulness or stability) that 
supposedly flows from the presence of (i) and (ii).    
One obvious worry is that these different aspects of law are not truly the same and might not 
therefore all be public goods. Some notions in play under the rubric ‘law’ seem more like 
‘indivisible lumps’ than others: the idea of security appears, when conceived as 
characterising a measurable property of community life, to be one from which some members 
cannot be excluded without wrongdoing.
32
 So, for example, if a community has the 
institutions, practices and personnel to ensure that its life is relatively free from crime and 
disorder, then it is hard to remove that benefit from some without subjecting them to 
victimisation. Similarly, the benefits of the original constitutional compact, once entered into, 
appear difficult to ration in anything like a legitimate way. That the benefits and burdens of 
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such a compact affect all who live under it is a fundamental component of its legitimacy. Any 
subsequent attempt to redistribute those benefits and burdens seems unavoidably to 
undermine the power of the original compact.       
While security and the original constitutional compact both look a great deal like indivisible 
lumps, and thus like public goods, private law does not. Not, at least, at first glance. Consider 
this hypothetical, originary possibility about the private law (or laws) of contract. The 
merchants and consumers of one geographical area use different standards to those in other 
areas, with merchants and consumers in different areas of economic activity doing likewise. 
While these different customary laws of contract could well be public goods for the various 
sub-groups in question, they are certainly not public goods for those outside these groups. 
The system of contract law used by bakers for bakers cannot be a public good for the 
candlestick makers excluded from it. This point – that it is conceivable that different laws of 
contract can emerge in different areas of one and the same polity – could be generalised 
across all aspects of private law. Thus, just as various groups might rely upon different rules 
for the creation or interpretation of contracts, so they might also use different rules to protect 
(inter alia) bodily integrity and physical holdings, or to distribute holdings on death. 
The possibility of a plurality of systems of private law speaks against private law being a 
public good, at least at some originary hypothetical moment. Yet the existence of a plurality 
of such systems within a single polity gives rise to externalities, the principal one being the 
costs involved to those participants who have to operate within more than one system.
33
 A 
single private law system for all would reduce this particular cost and others besides. 
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Therefore such a system might qualify as a public good for, once it is provided, its use is hard 
to limit on legitimate grounds. The doubt expressed by ‘might’ is appropriate, however, 
because even if it can be shown that the good which a general system of private law would 
provide is non-excludable, there remains a question as to whether that good is indeed non-
rivalrous. For, insofar as a court system and adjudication are adopted as the means of 
resolving private law and other legal disputes, the use of that system by some can in some 
circumstances prevent its use by others. One such circumstance is that in which the justice 
system is operating at or beyond the limits of its capacity.   
This worry and the non-excludability problem highlight the same general difficulty: is private 
law a pure public good? But the answer to that question, although interesting as a general 
matter, is not crucial in this context. Even if the argument in play here does not show that 
private law is a pure public good, it certainly shows that it has some features similar to such 
goods. And that  is all that needs to be shown to make the point that all law – private and 
public – is public, in the sense of being either a pure or impure public good.     
 
4. The fourth version of the distinction between public and private is claimed to be implicit 
within many legal systems, operating as an insufficiently noticed structuring principle 
underpinning legal doctrine. The distinction is that between the public realm of politics, law 
and the market, on the one hand, and the private realm of family, the household and intimacy, 
on the other. It is often invoked as a critical tool, a means of illustrating the gender inequality 
embedded within the formal equality of modern legal systems in particular and of liberal 
thought more generally.
34
 On this critique, these legal systems have provided less protection 
for women who are subject to violence by men in domestic contexts, have valued the labour 
of women in the home less than the labour of men outside the home, and have been loath to 
enforce allegedly ‘domestic’ agreements between men and women in relationships. The 
rationale for the law’s hesitancy to intervene in these and other areas is, in part, the thought 
that these realms are quintessentially private and therefore beyond the law’s reach.        
Few or no proponents of this gender critique of the law deny that there are some areas of 
social and individual life that should be beyond the law’s reach. The difficulty critics 
highlight with this thought, as currently or recently embodied in contemporary legal systems, 
is that it serves to systematically de-value women, their work and their interests. The question 
of where the limits upon the law’s reach lie is one which should be posed and answered in a 
genuinely open way and not just on the basis of embedded social practices, assumptions and 
stereotypes, particularly where these embody morally and politically questionable judgments. 
It might be thought that contemporary liberal polities already have an answer to this question 
and there is some truth in that. Most such polities do indeed have a conception of the limits of 
state power and influence which coexists with a commitment to equality under and before the 
law. A problem can, however, arise with the way in which such conceptions and their limits 
are instantiated within legal doctrine as well as with the way in which they inform policing 
and prosecutorial practice. 
As to legal doctrine, consider Article 8 of the ECHR, which holds, inter alia, that everyone 
has a right to respect for their private life. Such a right would be recognised by almost all 
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liberal accounts of the limits of the state, yet the qualified guarantee it offers is by no means 
certain to accord the same value to the interests of men and women. If we set aside the actual 
case law on this article and consider how  provisions might be interpreted, an obvious and 
apparently innocuous starting point is to construe them in light of the language, cultural 
context and everyday common sense of the society in which they figure.
 35
 The hope is that 
recourse to these factors will resolve the alleged ambiguity or guide interpreters as to the 
limits of the proposition or concept in play. This interpretative strategy is certainly not the 
only one the courts use. They must, for example, apply propositions of law and their 
constitutive concepts in light of existing law and that, almost always, necessitates 
consideration of other similar cases. But the contextual interpretative strategy is significant 
because it can constitute a Trojan horse by which common but morally and politically 
dubious judgments and assumptions enter into the law. This could happen with regard to 
Article 8 in this way. When provoked to deliberate upon the nature and range of ‘private life’, 
the courts could simply replicate the notion of private embodied in this version of the 
public/private distinction. The view that private life – the domain of family life and intimate 
relationships – is a women’s realm is not particularly uncommon in most societies with which 
we are familiar. If the courts follow this relatively widespread view of gender roles and the 
division of domestic labour, then they entrench it in the law and, in so doing, immunise it 
against legal and political change. For if the division of domestic labour is unequal, and if 
women’s work in and contribution towards family life is placed beyond the reach of law, then  
legal redress of that inequality is difficult. The difficulty, then, is not one of straightforward 
and explicit gender bias in either Article 8 itself or in the courts’ decisions. It is, rather, a 
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problem of ‘subtle distortions of prejudice and bias’36 that enter into adjudication via some of 
the common assumptions and understandings of ordinary language. And, as our hypothetical 
tale about Article 8 suggests, and as some studies of private law have shown, these distortions 
of prejudice and bias can ‘effectively discriminate against certain groups in the judicial 
process’.37          
Exactly the same distortions of prejudice and bias can inform decision-making in policing 
and prosecution. The view that the domestic realm of the private is and should be beyond the 
law certainly seems to explain the hesitancy that police forces and prosecutors have 
traditionally displayed when dealing with domestic violence. Nowhere is this more obvious 
than in the once common view among police officers that violence in the home is ‘just a 
domestic’.38 This view automatically downgrades the alleged crime in question, suggesting it 
is not worthy of a proper police response. The consequence is simply to attach less weight to 
the interests of alleged victims of this kind of crime than to those who suffer exactly the same 
type and level of violence but in other contexts. Nor need this set of attitudes and 
assumptions be confined to the policing of domestic violence. There is evidence to suggest 
that they also inform – or have informed – the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.39      
It is important to realise that propositions of law need not, as a matter of necessity, be 
informed by common understandings and assumptions that are morally and political dubious 
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and which often serve to subvert the law’s commitment to formal equality. While it is true 
that the law must be interpreted in the light of the language, concepts and understandings of 
the community of which it is part, not all aspects of that language and those concepts and 
understandings will be morally and politically dubious. Propositions of law must, first and 
foremost, be interpreted in such a way as to either embody or be consistent with the legal 
system’s fundamental values and commitments. Only when that constraint is met should the 
law aim for broad consistency with ordinary language and common sense. 
This version of the public/private distinction calls contemporary legal systems to account for 
various aspects of their practice in light of their fundamental values. There is no claim that 
either all law is public or all law is private or that all law is neither. Rather, the fundamental 
claim that proponents of this version of the distinction make is usually a warning and it 
counsels, at its broadest, something like this: that words, concepts, ideas and distinctions have 
power in the world when embodied in conduct, practices and institutions and this power is 
not always benign. Taken more narrowly, the warning is that ‘the’ public/private distinction 
has just this kind of non-benign power and we must be aware of this and resist it. In practical 
terms, it warns us that the realm of the private should not automatically be thought of as a 
law-free zone and, when it is, that the valuation such a judgment entails should always be 
made explicit.  
 
5. The final way of distinguishing public and private is a means of distinguishing only public 
and private law. It is a purely legal-doctrinal version of the public/private distinction and, in 
English law at least, it seems both undeniable and unproblematic. The distinction consists of 
highlighting the various doctrinal and procedural differences between private and public law. 
For much of the common law’s history in England the remedies for public law wrongs, the 
rules of standing, as well as the doctrinal requirements for establishing such wrongs and 
obtaining remedies, have been for the most part different from the wrongs, remedies and 
doctrinal requirements embodied in private law.
40
 There is now an administrative court in 
England, thus reinforcing a public law/private law divide.
 
 This set of doctrinal, remedial and 
procedural differences between public and private law is not, of course, the only possible set. 
Other jurisdictions draw the distinction in rather different ways,
41
 but there can be no doubt 
that they add up to a significant distinction between the two domains.  
The puzzle here is that some jurists find this way of distinguishing public and private law 
unsatisfying, without being perfectly clear as to why. They are content to note this legal-
doctrinal distinction, yet then proceed as if it is in need of further explanation and 
justification.
42
 What, then, is their worry? Perhaps that the legal-doctrinal distinction is 
insufficiently ‘deep’ or, what likely amounts to the same thing, is altogether too contingent. 
Thus, the distinction as currently embodied in English law might simply be an historical 
accident rather than a well-founded and valuable means of distinguishing private and public 
law. Espousing this view does not require great scepticism of the jurist or lawyer, but simply 
awareness that the law, either in the hands of judges, legislators, or both, can take wrong-
turnings. These turnings can be wrong in legal, moral or political terms. A statute, judicial 
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decision or line of decisions can inhibit desirable doctrinal development, or impact adversely 
on some aspect of commercial, social or cultural life, as well as embodying morally and 
politically objectionable distinctions or suppositions.
43
 This awareness inhibits the tendency 
to regard all legal-doctrinal development as always prima facie desirable and justified; it is 
part of the process of ‘demystifying the law’.44 
But there are at least two quite different responses to this aspect of law’s fallibility. One 
response combines a perfectly proper critical awareness of law’s normative (moral and 
political) fallibility with an equally proper awareness of law’s normative (moral and political) 
contingency. The latter entails little more than a realisation that some areas of law – taken to 
include not just chunks of substantive legal doctrine and their constitutive standards, but also 
procedural rules and broader aspects of institutional design such as the organisation of the 
trial process – are morally and politically either over-, under- or un-determined. The last 
possibility exists when some legal rule has no moral or political content, resonance or 
analogue, the first when quite different substantive moral or political values actually 
determine the content of the same area of law. The second possibility is realised when various 
different substantive moral or political values are consistent with the same area of law. 
Awareness of law’s moral and political contingency and fallibility provides a fertile soil for 
this legal-doctrinal distinction between public and private. This version of the distinction is 
malleable, context-dependent and unlikely to be dispositive in every legal dispute. Its 
contours have undeniably changed over time and, equally clearly, it has not been and is not 
now drawn in the same way as its legal-doctrinal equivalent in, for example, French law. 
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Moreover, while the distinction is expected to bear some weight in particular cases, it seems 
rarely in and of itself dispositive. Judges and jurists usually provide a panoply of reasons to 
support their decisions in cases in which a public/private question arises and this version of 
the distinction is almost never itself conclusive. In his dissenting judgment in R (Weaver) v. 
London and Quadrant Housing Trust, for example, Rix L.J. cited no less than ten different 
factors to justify his conclusion that a registered social landlord was not performing a public 
function when managing and allocating housing stock.
45
 The mutability and context- (or 
jurisdictional) dependence of the legal-doctrinal version of the public/private distinction also 
generates another and quite different response to that just noted. For some, this very 
mutability and context-dependence are sources of worry, since the distinction might well be 
drawn in a morally or politically mistaken way. This view implies some or other normative 
blueprint against which various ways of drawing the public/private distinction are measured; 
the current legal-doctrinal version of the distinction is or becomes objectionable if and when 
it departs from the ukases of the blueprint. Needless to say, this response fits ill with the tenor 
of this essay and some of its difficulties have been explored elsewhere.
46
  
2 Functions, Labels, Permeability 
There is an obvious objection to the discussion in the previous section: it has passed too 
glibly over legal and non-legal versions of the public/private distinction and, in doing so, has 
failed to note that different versions of the distinction might operate in quite different ways 
and with reference to very different criteria of success and failure. It is hard for us to deny the 
force of this objection, since its substance is the crux of the point we made earlier, namely, 
that different versions of the public/private distinction might differ quite markedly in their 
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‘methodological’ standing. Once it is accepted that some versions of the distinction are 
constructed within different intellectual, pragmatic and cultural contexts, that they might 
therefore utilise different criteria of success and failure, and that they can perform quite 
different functions, it becomes deeply tempting to place all five versions within one or other 
of two allegedly mutually exclusive categories.  The temptation must, however, be resisted.  
The first category includes general versions of the distinction. These are so named because 
they have a life in the wider culture of particular societies, being part of ordinary discourse, 
yet are often given more precise expression, and certainly more sustained attention, by 
historians, sociologists and other social scientists. It might be the case that versions of the 
public/private distinction at large in the culture of particular societies cannot be given more 
precise expression by social scientists because they are already as precise as they can be. But 
it is almost always true that social scientists, rather than minting new versions of the 
public/private distinction, purport to articulate and discover already existing but not 
sufficiently appreciated versions of the distinction. Already existing but insufficiently noticed 
versions have life not just within scholarly social scientific work but also beyond it, in some 
particular social and cultural context. 
The other category includes specific versions of the public/private distinction which, in 
contrast with general versions, are coined only by lawyers about the law. This contrast must 
be extended a little, for specific versions of the public/private distinction are additionally 
internal to the law. This says more than that they are made only by lawyers and jurists, for 
the lawyers and jurists who espouse specific versions of the public/private distinction do so 
from the viewpoint of participants in, rather than external observers of, the legal system. This 
might be because some lawyers and jurists are indeed participants in the legal system in a 
limited sense: they are practitioners, such as judges, advocates and legal advisers. Yet it is 
also because the participants’ point of view is the default mode of all doctrinal and much 
jurisprudential scholarship.
47
 Moreover, specific versions of the public/private distinction are 
usually intended by their proponents to operate within particular areas of legal doctrine (such 
as, for example, administrative law). These versions of the distinction therefore cannot often 
– if at all – be used as a means of organising or structuring legal systems as a whole. Some 
general versions of the distinction can be used to do just that, being invoked as organising 
principles under which many or all substantive legal doctrines are allegedly subsumable. 
General versions of the public/private distinction are also (i) rarely formulated from within 
the perspective of participants in the legal system; and (ii) almost never expected by their 
proponents to do legal doctrinal work. This is mainly because the methodological 
commitments of academic proponents of general versions of the distinction – they are, inter 
alia historians, economists, and sociologists – entail that the participant’s perspective is either 
suspect or not easily available.  
All but one of the five versions of the distinction sketched above can take general form. The 
first version, henceforth labelled ‘the public/private interest’ version, is general because it is  
neither developed by lawyers nor used exclusively by them. It operates as a general 
structuring principle for whole legal systems and has so significant a gravitational pull over 
many specific versions of the distinction as to cause dissatisfaction with them. However, we 
also noted that something like this general version of the public/private interest distinction is 
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frequently articulated and refined by the courts in one particular legal context and its dual 
resonance – sounding in both legal and non-legal contexts – is significant. First, it serves as a 
reminder that, while neither the Charity Commission nor the lawyers and judges who grapple 
with the question of public benefit see themselves as striving to articulate non-legal common 
sense – they look almost exclusively to the previous cases and the body of doctrinal writing 
on the topic in order to reach decisions in particular cases
48
 – they are nevertheless grappling 
with exactly those issues that animate any effort to utilise a general form of the public/private 
interest distinction. Second, it is clear from these cases that, while general versions of this 
distinction resonate within the law, the specific legal articulations of this distinction have no 
equivalent resonance at the general level. There is thus an undoubtedly asymmetric relation 
of influence between general and specific in this context which might be replicated 
elsewhere. Third, the dual resonance of the public/private interest distinction shows that the 
categories of ‘general’ and ‘specific’ really cannot be mutually exclusive. Just two versions 
of the public/private distinction can be appropriately assigned only to one or other category, 
while the public/private interest version and the other two clearly resonate or have analogues 
in both.    
The second version of the distinction – hereinafter ‘the state/non-state’ distinction – is one of 
these, having both a general and a specific form. In both forms the distinction is intended to 
function as a means of drawing and policing the parameters of the state. And while  that aim 
is indeed important, the intention can be thwarted by the very malleability of the ‘state’. Like 
all social products, this complex of institutions, practices, norms and expectations can be re-
made, sometimes intentionally and deliberately – as we see in the privatisation of some state 
functions which has been portrayed in some jurisdictions as a ‘rolling back’ of the powers of 
state and government – and sometimes as the unintentional consequence of other intentional 
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actions (as when temporary economic imperatives trigger state intervention in a particular 
domain which then becomes permanent and extended to other similar domains). The very 
plasticity of the social world thus ensures that efforts to map it are always at risk of 
redundancy and supersession.
49
 Changes in the role and extent of the state are therefore 
almost guaranteed to cause difficulty for this version of the public/private distinction, insofar 
as it is rooted in a particular social and historical context, for changes in that context will 
likely affect the efficacy and accuracy of the distinction. Some might take this risk as a 
reminder of the futility of offering historically specific versions of state/non-state distinction, 
turning instead to the task of developing a respectable normative blueprint for the role of the 
state wherever and whenever found. While there can be no general intellectual objection to 
that process, its utility as a means of mapping and understanding our present condition can 
rightly be questioned.    
Although it is important to realise that the courts in many common law jurisdictions are 
articulating specific legal analogues of the state/non-state distinction when deciding judicial 
review or some human rights cases, it is equally important to appreciate what they are not 
doing when doing this. One thing the courts clearly do not do is enter into an opened-ended 
analysis of the role of the contemporary state. They almost never inform themselves of 
contemporary social-scientific accounts of the modern state nor do they catalogue, except 
insofar as it is crucial to the dispute in hand, the changing tidemarks of state activity over 
time. Nor is it the case that many social scientists engaged in exactly this kind of study of the 
state/non-state spheres inform themselves of the efforts of the courts in marking these 
boundaries. But this is not to say that the delineation and interrogation of both general and 
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specific versions of the state/non-state distinction go on completely independently. For it 
seems to be the case that the asymmetry noted in the discussion of the public/private interest 
distinction operates here, in the sense that while general versions of the state/non-state 
distinction pay no heed to specific versions, specific versions can in two senses be 
conditioned by the discourse about general versions.     
One sense is this: lawyers can make use of and recommend distinctions, ideas and theories 
formulated outside the methodological perspective of their discipline. Legal academics might 
do this in order to throw light on some aspects of the law, either at the level of specific 
doctrinal issues or at the level of broad structuring principles for the legal system as a whole. 
And legal practitioners might do this insofar as it promises a solution to a particular legal 
dispute acceptable to a court. In these two ways, then, general versions of the state/non-state 
distinction can penetrate the legal domain, the domain of specific versions of the distinction. 
Furthermore, there is a second sense in which general versions of the state/non-state 
distinction might well affect the specific versions of the distinction lawyers articulate. The 
effect here is less direct than that just noted, but no less significant, and has already been 
hinted at in our discussion of the public/private interest distinction. All general versions of 
the public/private distinction, current in the wider culture, can serve to destabilise and breed 
dissatisfaction with most specific versions. That, we think, is evident when lawyers struggle 
with the notions of public interest and public benefit in equity, and is also in play when 
lawyers endeavour to pin down the sources or function of the ‘state’ in administrative law. 
The specific distinctions drawn are almost always regarded as tentative and in some sense 
ultimately unsatisfying. The latter sense, we suggest, flows either from what we (lawyers) 
know of the general version of the distinction we are articulating and deploying in a specific 
legal context, or by what we know of different general versions of the distinction. Knowing, 
for example, of both the first and third versions of the public/private distinction means we are 
aware of the plausible senses in which all law is public; distinctions drawn between public 
and private legal power, as are sometimes required in the administrative law context, come to 
seem quite unsatisfactory in this light.     
The fourth version of the public/private distinction, which we will christen the ‘public/private 
life’ version, is the remaining distinction of the five that has dual resonance. In its general 
form, the public/private life distinction is portrayed by social scientists, philosophers and 
jurists as a morally and politically questionable organising principle of many existing legal 
systems. Yet efforts to map a boundary between public and private life also exist within the 
law, as we saw from the discussion above: insofar as most legal systems incorporate a 
provision or doctrine akin to article 8 of the ECHR, then they will need to draw this 
boundary. As well as this dual resonance, the asymmetry noted in the discussion of the 
public/private interest and state/non-state distinctions probably exists here also. Even a 
superficial familiarity with the courts’ efforts to draw a boundary between private and public 
life, and an equally superficial grasp of the various general versions of this distinction, shows 
that the former make almost no impact on the latter, save that they sometimes function as 
grist for a critical mill. For on the rare occasions that proponents of general versions of the 
public/private life distinction do indeed engage with specific versions, the latter are almost 
invariably regarded as unsatisfactory.
50
         
Given their obvious dissimilarities, it seems odd to hold that the third and fifth versions of the 
public/private distinction have something in common. The similarity is methodological: both 
versions are similar among the five sketched here because their status is univocal, resonating 
within only one domain. The third version, hereinafter the ‘public/private goods’ version, is 
interesting in that it lacks any specific analogue, while the fifth version – the ‘legal-doctrinal’ 
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version – is interesting for the exactly opposite reason: it lacks any general analogue.51 The 
public/private goods distinction lacks any specific analogue or resonance possibly because of 
its genesis at the hands of economists and game theorists. Their concerns seem to have no 
specific legal equivalents, except in the sense that the existence of law itself, or particular 
branches thereof, is or might be a public good.  The legal doctrinal distinction lacks any 
general analogue for a substantively similar reason - it is the product only of lawyers’ hands 
and is responsive (or was thought to be responsive) only to uniquely legal concerns.  
The fact that three of the five versions of the public/private distinction have a dual resonance 
is quite compatible with the claim that specific and general versions of these distinctions have 
different functions. Some specific versions are intended to answer a precise legal question, 
usually within the realm of some specific statutory provisions and body of case law, whereas 
some general versions are efforts to understand and explain aspects of the social world at a 
fairly abstract level. But these  different functions do not prevent accounts of one or other 
version of the distinction at the general level influencing accounts of the same distinction at 
the specific level; nor do they prevent different general versions of the distinction affecting – 
positively or negatively – one another. What seems unlikely, though, is that different specific 
versions of the distinction will or can affect one another, for the simple reason that these 
occupy quite different legal doctrinal domains. That the two former claims (general versions 
of the distinction can and do affect specific versions, and that different general versions can 
affect one another) do indeed characterise much contemporary thought about ‘the’ 
public/private distinction cannot be shown in any detail here, since that would require a broad 
and detailed survey of the various idioms used, along with an elucidation of their many 
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intersections and disjunctions. In lieu of such a survey, we proffer those two claims, 
henceforth combined into one and labelled ‘the permeability thesis’, as a putative explanation 
of the sense of quagmire, impasse and dissatisfaction lawyers often experience when 
articulating ‘the’ public/private distinction. It is therefore  especially troubling that the 
permeability thesis is likely to be received with some scepticism by lawyers. 
Two considerations animate this scepticism. One is that all lawyers are familiar with what we 
might call the law’s stipulative sovereignty, its power to define words and concepts in its own 
way and for its own purposes.
52
 From the surely undeniable point that the law can to some 
extent coin its own technical vocabulary, it is tempting to move to the claim that the law’s 
store of language and concepts stands independently of the language and concepts of non-
legal life. This claim becomes radically implausible in so far as it holds that all the law’s 
concepts and words can have a technical meaning bearing no relation at all to the meaning 
those same words and concepts have in non-legal life. For even if that were possible, it would 
be profoundly undesirable, since it thwarts the very point of law and legal systems, namely, 
to act as a means of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.
53
 That point is, of 
course, one that embraces many other more specific and far less abstract goals and purposes, 
none of which could be achieved if the directives that make up a legal system are utterly 
unintelligible to its addressees. So, while some legal concepts and words can and do bear a 
technical meaning for some specific purposes, not all can if law is to fulfil its principal 
function. Lawyers long familiar with the law’s technicality must neither exaggerate its range 
nor forget the significance of law’s many and myriad overlaps with ordinary meaning, 
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language and concepts. The point may seem abstract, but it is also viscerally practical for any 
judge who must direct a jury or make herself plain to non-lawyers. Practical concerns such as 
these surely also animate the doctrine of judicial notice in the common law world.
54
  
It is, then, a mistake to think that law’s stipulative sovereignty undermines the permeability 
thesis. For, while it is clearly not impossible for most legal systems with which we are 
familiar to contain provisions defining ‘public’ and ‘private’ in a technical way for some 
specific purpose, this possibility cannot of itself rule out the ‘interference’ from other, 
broader legal and non-legal conceptions of public and private that the permeability thesis 
posits. Furthermore such interference, albeit across a broad range of legal concepts and words 
rather than just the notions of public and private, is to be expected. If law is indeed a means 
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, then its rules must be intelligible to 
their addressees.  And that presupposes that the content of some of those rules overlap, in 
terms of meaning, with the language, words and concepts of those to whom they apply.  
There is, however, a second and related reason why lawyers might be sceptical about the 
permeability thesis. All lawyers and many non-lawyers know that legal analysis, either in 
chambers, the court room, or the seminar room, is not an argumentative free-for-all. The kind 
of considerations that lawyers can invoke in this process form a relatively limited class, but 
they go slightly beyond the bare letter of the law, as found in statutes and cases. For cases and 
statutes are read by lawyers in light of more general legal considerations, which include not 
just broader principles of law under which particular cases and statutory provisions can be 
subsumed, but also ‘internal’ legal considerations of fairness and efficiency, as well as 
general extra-legal considerations of justice and common sense. While the latter might 
present a door through which the permeability thesis can enter, lawyers are likely to resist this 
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prospect because they know well that the number and type of both legal and extra-legal 
factors to which they and other lawyers can properly refer are rigorously policedHow? 
Simply by the existing expectations and standards of their professional group. Socialisation 
into that group, through both non-vocational and vocational legal training, informs would-be 
lawyers of the type of considerations, in addition to the bare letter of the law, that carry 
weight in legal analysis. Those considerations also often provide a particular ‘reading’ of 
specific cases and legal issues, for the mere fact that a case has been decided by a senior 
appellate court does not determine how, exactly, lawyers subsequently understand or interpret 
the case. Indeed, it is quite possible for the reading of a case to change quite radically among 
lawyers, and not just as a result of a later appellate court decision.
55
 How might that come 
about?  
The best answer also seems like the least informative: the professional group changes ‘its’ 
mind on some matter. But is the group really so cohesive that it can be personified in this 
way? Some have thought so. Consider Brian Simpson’s account of cohesion in a customary 
legal order, of which common law systems are obvious instances: 
A customary system of law can function only if it can preserve a considerable measure of continuity and 
cohesion, and it can do this only if mechanisms exist for the transmission of traditional ideas and the 
encouragement of orthodoxy. There must exist within the group – particularly amongst its most powerful 
members – strong pressures against innovation; young members of the group must be thoroughly 
indoctrinated before they achieve any position of influence, and anything more than the most modest 
originality of thought treated as heresy.
56
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Were this account true of the contemporary legal profession, then it might indeed seem like a 
potential block to the permeability thesis.  But this is only a matter of appearance: this 
account does not purport to characterise contemporary common law legal systems nor does it. 
Rather, it is an account of conditions which ‘were almost ideally satisfied’ in ‘past 
centuries’.57 That those conditions are not currently ‘ideally satisfied’ nor particularly likely 
to be so in the near future is evident, in many areas of the common law world, from both the 
nature of contemporary legal education and the practices of appellate courts and senior 
judges. Legal education is now much more a matter of exploring the insights other disciplines 
offer about law than it once was,
58
 while appellate courts, in the UK at least, are ostensibly 
much broader in their reading and citations than they were. The latter is plain not only from 
the fact that judgments in, for example, the Supreme Court and former House of Lords are 
often dotted with references to the law and legal commentary of other jurisdictions;
59
 they 
also frequently cite and discuss academic and related legal commentary. Of course, these 
changes are assuredly a matter of degree but, when combined with the apparently 
increasingly common propensity of our judges to engage in extra-judicial speaking and 
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writing,
60
 they suggest that the legal profession is nowhere near as inward looking and insular 
as it might have been. Indeed, it is not a great exaggeration to claim that these are signs of an 
unprecedented general intellectual openness and engagement across all aspects of the legal 
profession. Such openness and engagement provides a fecund environment for the 
permeability thesis and a barren one for the conditions Simpson identifies.   
Lawyers’ scepticism about the permeability thesis seems, then, to be misplaced. But even if 
the thesis is immune to these lawyerly concerns, its status must not be exaggerated. It is 
forwarded here only as an empirical claim and, as such, it is ripe for testing and either 
confirmation or rejection. It is certainly not a conceptual truth. The thesis might therefore at 
some point fail to characterise our thinking about public and private. If and when it does, then 
our thinking about ‘the’ public/private distinction will assuredly have changed. 
3 Indeterminacy 
We now turn to our second principal claim, that the versions of the public/private distinction 
operative in law are almost never doctrinally dispositive. By the latter we mean simply that, 
when in play in the kind of cases with which we are familiar, ‘the’ public/private distinction 
is rarely utterly conclusive to the resolution of those cases.
61
 In part this is a result of the 
properties of that kind of case and in part a result of properties ‘the’ distinction itself has, 
most of which we have already noted. That is the argument offered here but, before 
unpacking it, two preliminary points must be made. The first highlights an obvious limitation: 
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the argument we actually provide shows only that one version of the distinction, invoked in 
only one area of law, is almost never doctrinally dispositive. The version of the distinction in 
play is the second – the state/non-state distinction – and, as we will see, our brief 
characterisation of the way in which it operates in the case law in section II was far too 
bluntly drawn. Considerations of space and time dictate this narrowness of focus, but so, too, 
do considerations of argumentative clarity and weight. A powerful case in relation to one 
instance of the distinction can ground a presumption that such a case could be made in other 
instances, although it is an obvious mistake to move too quickly from one to all. The second 
point is a calming notice. Some might regard our effort to show that ‘the’ public/private 
distinction is almost never dispositive in the case law as a pointlessly sustained restatement of 
the blindingly obvious, for who ever thought the contrary? Who, that is, ever thought that 
‘the’ public/private distinction should or ought to do dispositive doctrinal work? Our answer 
to that question is this: many influential legal scholars in the common law world.
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The cases in which the state/non-state version of the distinction is in play are, like the cases 
where other versions are in play, hard appellate court cases. Hard cases are complex and 
require judgment. They cannot be solved by judges in anything like an automatic way by, for 
instance, a ‘logarithmic’ invocation of the state/non-state distinction or of any other 
proposition of law. This, it has been said, is because hard cases are those ‘in which 
reasonable lawyers disagree’ and ‘where no settled rule dictates a decision either way’.63 A 
more expansive and helpful, but still abstract statement of the hallmarks of hard cases, was 
offered by Neil MacCormick, who maintained that such cases usually present one or more of 
three possible doctrinal snags. First, they might raise a question as to which interpretation, 
from a range of two or more available interpretations of an agreed proposition of law, applies 
to the case at bar. Second, they arise from doubt as to which proposition of law, from a range 
of two or more incompatible propositions of law, applies to the case at bar. Finally, they 
might raise the question of whether or not any proposition of law applies to the case at bar.
64
 
These cases thus require not just a statement of the correct applicable proposition of law, but 
also argument justifying that precise statement of the law. MacCormick shows that in the UK 
judges typically seek to justify their doctrinal choices in hard cases by three different kinds of 
argument. Two of the three kinds of argument are intra-systemic, involving considerations 
internal to the legal system. Of these two, one kind – arguments from consistency – embody 
‘a fundamental judicial commandment: Thou shalt not controvert established and binding 
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rules of law’.65 Arguments from consistency are narrow in the sense that they focus solely on 
propositions of law in the immediate vicinity of the dispute in question, holding that no 
argument will be acceptable if it: (i) is clearly incompatible with a closely contiguous 
proposition of law; and (ii) is unsupported by one of the remaining two kinds of argument. 
The focus of the second kind of argument – from coherence – is still upon considerations 
internal to the legal system, but is nevertheless wider than the focus of arguments from 
consistency. This is because considerations of coherence test, reject or commend an argument 
in a hard case by reference to its resonance (or lack of it) with principles and values of the 
legal system as whole, rather than just the area of doctrine within which the case has arisen. 
Such arguments, says MacCormick, rest on the assumption ‘that the multitudinous rules of a 
developed legal system should ‘make sense’ when taken together’. 66  The focus of 
consequentialist arguments – the third type of argument invoked by judges to justify their 
decisions in hard cases – is extra-systemic, looking to the effects of a hard case ruling one 
way or another on society as a whole. Rather than being concerned with what makes sense 
within the legal system, they are concerned with ‘what makes sense in the world’.67 What, 
then, is the criterion of sense here? It consists of evaluating the consequences of a decision 
one way or another. It is a matter of ‘choosing between rival possible rulings in a case [and] 
involves choosing between what are to be conceived of as rival models for, rival patterns of, 
human conduct in society’.68 It seems to be the case that consequentialist arguments are often 
the strongest kind of argument in this trio.
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This account of how judges do and should decide hard cases can be contested but, for non-
sceptics at least, the space for dispute is limited. Just about all non-sceptical jurists accept a 
picture of what hard cases look like which is very similar to that offered by MacCormick; the 
same jurists also agree that the arguments MacCormick finds judges actually using when 
deciding cases are indeed appropriate considerations for judges to use.
70
 Disagreement arises, 
however, as to which of these kinds of consideration should dominate: Ronald Dworkin, for 
instance, has little truck with MacCormick’s claim that consequentialist arguments do and 
should dominate other arguments. Consequentialist arguments are, of course, far too similar 
to arguments of policy in the Dworkinian schema and, as we all now know, arguments of 
principle trump arguments of policy.
71
 However interesting they might be, the details of this 
internecine jurisprudential dispute are not germane here. Our point, remember, is the claim 
that most reported cases in which the (or ‘a’) public/private distinction features are hard 
cases. Being such, they raise the three broad doctrinal issues, and are resolved by any 
combination of the three distinct kinds of argument, just noted. 
What, then, is the moral of this story? That expecting any version of the distinction between 
public and private law to be of use in judicial decision-making is a mistake, if ‘of use’ is 
taken to mean ‘conclusively dispositive of any particular hard case’. Hard cases are not, and 
can never be, so easily resolved. Even a cursory glance at the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
judicial review case law illustrates this. Furthermore, these cases are not merely hard cases: 
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they are hard cases which manifest a relatively high level of indeterminacy as a result in part, 
at least, of the existence of multiple sub-versions of the state/non-state, public/private 
distinction. We therefore supplement the principal argumentative claim of this essay – that 
there are many versions of the public/private distinction – with a related but subsidiary claim, 
that there are numerous versions of this particular public/private distinction. 
Consider section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which provides that ‘[i]t is unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a [European] Convention right.’ 
The term ‘public authority’ is undefined but includes what are known as ‘hybrid’ public 
authorities: that is, ‘any person[s] certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature’.72 But s. 6 also implicitly includes ‘core’ or ‘obvious’ public authorities, which are 
unlike hybrids because they must comply with the Convention in everything they do, whether 
public or private activity. This is due to s. 6(5), which relieves hybrids, but not core public 
authorities, of the obligation to obey the Convention when ‘the nature of the act is private’. 
Section 6 is therefore something of a matryoshka doll, containing a nest of different sub-
versions of the public/private distinction, all supposedly ultimately geared to distinguishing 
‘state’ from ‘non-state’. The first, between core public authorities and private persons, is 
institutional in nature. It looks to who the body in question is, focussing on the distinction 
between bodies constitutionally bound to act for others and those, on the other hand, 
permitted to act for their own ends within the confines of the law.
73
 The second sub-
distinction, between public and private functions, focusses instead on what the body does in 
the circumstances in question: it is the function that gives rise to its classification as either 
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public or private.
74
 The third, generated by s. 6(5), is between public and private acts. Even if 
a body is presumptively a hybrid public authority by virtue of performing a public function, 
the Convention will still not apply if the act in question is public rather than private. The 
distinction between functions under s. 6(3)(b) and acts under s. 6(5) is tricky and 
underdeveloped, leaving this third sub-distinction somewhat stunted and malformed 
compared to the first two.  
Section 6(5) was overlooked altogether in early cases concerning the meaning of public 
authority under s. 6
75
 and even when, as in more recent cases, courts did recognise its 
significance, they have applied it so as to denude it of any real purpose. In Weaver, Elias L.J. 
and Lord Collins M.R. believed that the act in question would be of the same nature as the 
function to which it pertained if the former was ‘part and parcel’ of or ‘inextricably linked’ 
with the latter.
76
 The idea was applied broadly, too, with the termination of a tenancy by a 
registered social landlord being regarded as part and parcel of its function of managing and 
allocating housing stock. Whilst a broad application is understandable given the obvious need 
to prevent s. 6(5) from unduly undermining the scope for rights protection set by s. 6(3)(b), it 
has the side-effect of suggesting that s. 6(5) will make little difference in practice. This is 
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principally because the courts are yet to rule that a given act is not part and parcel of the 
public function to which it is said by the applicant to pertain. On a conceptual level, the 
distinction between functions and acts was restated and affirmed by Lord Neuberger in YL:  
‘The former has a more conceptual, and perhaps less specific, meaning than the latter. 
A number of different acts can be involved in the performance of a single function’.77  
 
Yet the crucial point is that, if viewed as a conclusively dispositive touchstone, this statutory 
version of the public/private distinction is a complete failure. If the courts are satisfied that 
the body is not an institutionally public person, they must still go on to ask whether it is 
performing a public function and then, if it is, a particular public act. They can only resolve 
the public/private issue itself by considering three different iterations of the state/non-state 
(public/private) divide. Even having found that the body is a public authority, the courts will 
still have a number of other issues to tackle. 
The House of Lords’ decision in Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank78 provides a good illustration of 
the range of issues that can be in play. This case did indeed raise a question about the nature 
of public and private functions, since one of the issues the court had to address was whether 
or not a parochial church council of the Church of England was a public authority under s. 6. 
It might thus be regarded as an instance of ‘the’ public/private distinction being invoked to 
determine conclusively the decision in the case. But the public/private issue was only one  of 
a number of pertinent issues in the case, the remaining ones including: (i) the state of the law 
on chancel repairs; (ii) the retrospective applicability of the Human Rights Act 1998; and (iii) 
the question of whether or not the parochial church council’s order to lay rectors was 
compatible with the lay rectors’ rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. At 
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least three of the four issues in this case – the law on chancel repairs being relatively 
unambiguous – are easily subsumable under one or more of the abstract hallmarks of hard 
cases. So, for example, the issue of the applicability of the Human Rights Act 1998 raises the 
question of which interpretation of an agreed proposition of law applies (the interpretative 
choice being between (i) the Human Rights Act 1998 does apply retrospectively and (ii) the 
Human Rights Act 1998 does not apply retrospectively). Determining the compatibility issue 
(was the parochial church council’s order compatible with Article 1?) was a matter of either 
choosing between different propositions of law or different interpretations of an agreed 
proposition of law. 
It is undeniable that two of the issues in Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank
79
 were closely related: 
the question of incompatibility with Article 1 becomes live only if the parochial church 
council is a public authority under s. 6. Yet it is simply wrong to regard the public/private 
issue as the only or even the most significant matter in the case. Furthermore, it is no surprise 
to find the judges resolving the question of the public or private status of a parochial church 
council via arguments of coherence and consistency. The judgments of Lords Hope, 
Hobhouse and Rodger include not just arguments of consistency, in which they address the 
English cases on the legal standing of the Church of England, but also arguments of 
coherence, in which they consider Strasbourg’s decisions on, inter alia, the status of Greek 
monasteries and the Swedish church.
80
 These strands of legal doctrine were less significant in 
Lord Scott’s judgment, perhaps because his view, unlike that held by Lords Nicholls, Hope, 
Hobhouse and Rodger, was that the parochial parish council was a hybrid public authority, 
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exercising a public function.
81
 The nature of public authorities under legislation such as the 
Scotland Act 1998 was also discussed by Lord Hope.
82
 Interestingly, consequentialist 
arguments featured in the judgments only fleetingly. They took the form of discontent about 
the potential harshness of the law on chancel repairs and played a role in bolstering the view 
that parochial church councils should not be regarded as public bodies.
83
 
Cases in the judicial review context also rarely revolve around one single disputed 
interpretation of the public/private (state/non-state) distinction. The issues in play in such 
cases are just as diverse as those animating the Human Rights Act cases. Thus, even if a body 
is found to be performing a public function under the Civil Procedure Rules (‘CPR’), so the 
decision in question is amenable to judicial review, this will not of itself determine the 
outcome of a hard case. A court will still have to satisfy itself that the body has acted 
unlawfully according to the principles of good administration (the duty to act fairly, rationally 
and the like), that there is no reason to make use of the judicial discretion to withhold the 
remedy the claimant seeks, and so on. One particularly well-known case illustrates the point. 
In Datafin
84
 the Court of Appeal held that the Panel was amenable to judicial review in its 
capacity as de facto regulator of City take-overs, but nevertheless held that it had not acted 
unlawfully by dismissing the applicant’s complaint that a bidding rival had breached the 
Panel’s City Code.85 This raised three quite separate issues: whether the Panel is amenable, 
whether it has acted unlawfully according to the relevant substantive principles and whether, 
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if the answer to the two previous questions is affirmative, the court should issue the remedy 
sought.  
Although Sir John Donaldson M.R. believed that the answers to the second and third 
questions were relatively clear,
86
 the resolution of all three undoubtedly called for judgment 
and consequentialist arguments featured at each stage. Donaldson M.R. was particularly 
vocal in his view that the Panel should in principle be amenable to judicial review – for the 
reason that it wielded  wide-ranging de facto powers that would otherwise lie beyond the 
law’s reach: ‘Suppose, perish the thought, that it were to use its powers in a way which was 
manifestly unfair? … Parliament could and would intervene … but how long would that take 
and who in the meantime could or would come to the assistance of those who were being 
oppressed by such conduct?’87  Arguments from consistency featured in the amenability 
analysis, too, as is evident from the lengths to which their Lordships went to emphasise the 
compatibility of their conclusion with the existing case law in this area. Donaldson M.R. 
remarked that ‘given its novelty, the panel fits surprisingly well into the format which this 
court had in mind in [R v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; ex parte Lain].’88 Lloyd 
L.J. was more emphatic: ‘I do not accept … that we are here extending the law’.89  
Consequentialist arguments feature in the court’s analysis of the second and third issues, 
which analysis centred around the Panel’s curious position as a de facto regulator responsible 
both for devising and policing the City Code. Donaldson M.R. believed there was ‘little 
scope for a complaint that the panel has promulgated rules which are ultra vires, provided that 
they do not clearly violate the principle proclaimed by the panel of being based upon the 
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concept of doing equity between one shareholder and another’.90 As for remedies, he held 
that the ‘only circumstances in which I would anticipate the use of… certiorari and 
mandamus would be in the event, which I hope is unthinkable, of the panel acting in breach 
of the rules of natural justice’. 91  Declaratory orders, he believed, were generally more 
appropriate: 
in the light of the special nature of the panel, its functions, the market in which it is operating, the time 
scales which are inherent in that market and the need to safeguard the position of third parties … I should 
expect the court to allow contemporary decisions to take their course, considering the complaint and 
intervening, if at all, later and in retrospect by declaratory orders which would enable the panel not to 
repeat any error and would relieve the individuals of the disciplinary consequences of any erroneous 
finding of breach of the rules. This would provide a workable and valuable partnership between the 
courts and the panel in the public interest …92 
More interestingly still, in certain judicial review cases – a domain in which the various sub-
versions of the state/non-state distinction are most obviously in play – the courts also have 
recourse to a quite different version of public/private distinction. It is the fifth, legal-doctrinal 
version of the distinction and it is invoked in the effort to ensure that an applicant is not 
abusing the process of the court by pursuing the wrong procedure. This is the ‘procedural 
exclusivity’ rule. Whereas the amenability issue relates to the function the defendant 
performs, this rule implicates a different version of the public/private distinction because it 
seeks to distinguish between public and private claims.
93
 It operates to prevent applicants 
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The rule derives from O’Reilly v. Mackman,94 in which the claimants were prisoners who 
sought to contest their conviction of disciplinary offences under the Prison Rules by 
proceeding through writ in the Queens’ Bench and Chancery Divisions of the High Court. 
The House of Lords unanimously held that this was an abuse of process. Although the 
claimants proceeded in private law, the decision-maker (the board of prison visitors) was 
fairly obviously a public body, the claimants were arguing their claim on the basis of a breach 
of the rules of natural justice and they sought a declaration that the board’s decisions were 
void. To all intents and purposes, their claim, if successful, would have had the same effect as 
the award of a quashing order in judicial review. As Lord Diplock explained, this was 
because the Secretary of State was empowered to remit a disciplinary award and would 
presumably have done so following a declaration by the High Court that the award was a 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the circumstances (they cannot be sure, for instance, that a claimant should have pursued a judicial review 
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nullity.
95
 The claimants also seemed to have no arguable cause of action in private law, their 
choice of procedure merely camouflaging an altogether different type of claim.
96
 All things 
considered, their Lordships thought that the claimants’ choice of private-law procedure 
served only to circumvent the various procedural protections designed to safeguard the 
decision-maker (shorter time limits, and so on) in judicial review.  
The procedural exclusivity rule has proved difficult to apply in circumstances where 
applicants have arguable claims in both public and private law on the same set of facts. This 
might be the case, for example, if ‘private’ rights that would usually be enforceable against a 
public body in contract or tort can be enhanced or diminished by the exercise by that body of 
a statutory discretion. If the applicant wishes to challenge the use of that discretion, it is by no 
means self-evidently clear which procedure they should pursue. Fiddly and unconvincing 
distinctions arise as a result.
97
 In recent years the courts seem to have taken a more relaxed 
stance than they did immediately post-O’Reilly, tolerating a greater degree of flexibility and 
allowing choice to claimants whose claims straddle both public and private law. As Sedley 
L.J. remarked in Clark v. University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, ‘the ground has shifted 
considerably since 1982 when O’Reilly v. Mackman was decided.’98 In Clark itself, which 
concerned a contractual challenge to a university’s decision to fail the claimant’s 
undergraduate dissertation for plagiarism, the Court of Appeal held, in Lord Woolf M.R.’s 
words, that ‘the court will not strike out a claim which could more appropriately be made [in 
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judicial review] … solely because of the procedure which has been adopted’.99  But the 
O’Reilly rule still remains, as Lord Woolf was at pains to stress: the court may strike out a 
claim ‘if it comes to the conclusion that in all the circumstances, including the delay in 
initiating the proceedings, there has been an abuse of the process of the court’.100 Thus, for 
some applicants at least, the public/private nature of their claim will continue to matter. The 
procedural exclusivity rule is therefore a further issue that may stand in the way of the courts’ 
disposal of a hard case and yet another example of our central claim, that there are many 
public/private distinctions rather than just one. 
That these particular cases – all of which concern various iterations of the state/non-state 
version of the public/private distinction and some of which concern the legal doctrinal 
version of that distinction – are hard cases seems certain. If we are right in this, then they 
constitute the first step of a more general claim unsubstantiated here, namely, that almost all 
cases that concern any version of the public/private distinction are hard cases. And, if  that is 
so, then it is surely a mistake to expect the distinction to perform anything like a doctrinally 
dispositive role in those cases. Furthermore, we have offered additional reasons why no 
version of the distinction should be expected to do doctrinally dispositive work: first, because 
it is rare for there to be only one single version in play; and second, even if there is only one 
single version in play in a hard case, that single version is assuredly no less malleable than 
any other version of the distinction nor less subject to ‘interference’ from other versions of 
the distinction. That is the force of the permeability thesis outlined in section 2. Yet there is 
one further and quite different reason which suggests it is implausible to think that any 
version of the public/private distinction can do doctrinally dispositive work. It is most 
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economically expressed by this question: how many other equally broad or even much 
narrower legal distinctions are ever dispositive in particular hard cases?  
The distinction between mens rea and actus reus in the criminal law is often just as contested 
and as unhelpful – as in need of mediation and elaboration – as that between public and 
private law. The distinction, which all common lawyers take for granted, between contract 
and tort is equally tricky and hardly ever dispositive; nor is the fact that it rarely resolves 
particular hard (or perhaps even easy) cases ever regarded as a reason for rejecting the 
distinction. Rather, this fact is taken to indicate something meaningful about the nature of the 
distinction itself. Lawyers’ expectations about the pragmatic power of these distinctions are 
apparently nowhere near as high as the expectations held of the public/private distinction. 
There are, of course, two quite different inferences that can be drawn from this observation. 
One is that we are wrong to expect so little of these other distinctions. The other is that low 
expectations are justified, because distinctions of this kind are of limited use when faced with 
the fine detail and broad range of issues presented by hard cases. Obviously, the arguments 
already advanced in this essay give reason to favour the latter, rather than the former, 
inference. And this has important implications for the on-going debate about ‘the’ 
public/private distinction in the contexts we have just considered.  
Since ‘the’ distinction is indeterminate and rarely if ever dispositive, lawyers are issued with 
the stark reminder that it just cannot be an ‘algorithmic’ solution to any interesting or 
complex legal question. It is, rather, but one piece in a broader jigsaw that seeks to dispose of 
hard cases justly. Awkward terms like ‘public function’ and ‘public authority’ – which, as our 
analysis suggests, are unavoidably open to re-interpretation and contestation – are therefore 
unlikely to be defined in such a way as to generate unanimous assent. Nor is much lost if this 
is so. For even if the courts’ definition of these terms happens to exclude the activities of 
some bodies that wield considerable power from the scope of judicial review or the Human 
Rights Act – the Jockey Club, for example101 – it does not follow that the definition is flawed 
and must be re-thought. There may be other useful ways in which the common law can 
regulate such bodies, as the courts themselves have recognised,
102
 and legislation surely 
remains a viable option in the event that the common law as a whole proves inadequate. 
Parliament should, after all, retain some role in regulating society’s myriad power 
imbalances.  
Conversely, over-inclusiveness is not necessarily a problem. In the event that the definition of 
a public function is extended by the courts to encompass, say, the activities of private and 
charitable organisations providing services on behalf of central and local government- an 
inclusion which may be unpalatable to some
103
-  it should be borne in mind that a number of 
mechanisms will remain open to the courts to mitigate any resulting harshness to the would-
be public authority. In the Human Rights Act context, for instance, nothing stops private 
organisations pleading their own Convention rights as a defence to Convention-based claims 
against them – even when they are performing public functions under s. 6(3)(b).104 In the 
judicial review context, too, the substantive principles of good administration should be 
malleable enough to adjust to the particular situation. Datafin
105
 provides a good example of 
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this, through its cautious application of those substantive principles to the City Panel.
106
 In 
short, public-authority status is not the only factor that determines a body’s legal liability. 
Given the malleability of terms like ‘public authority’ and ‘public function’, and the resulting 
disagreement that can ensue over how to interpret them, lawyers would do well to remember 
that algorithmic determinacy here is a chimera.  
. . . . . 
The arguments of this essay must not be misunderstood. By showing that there are many 
versions of ‘the’ public/private distinction rather than one, and that various versions of the 
distinction should not be expected to do dispositive doctrinal work, we are not aiming to 
close down the conversation about public and private, either among lawyers or any other 
group. Rather, our aim is to engender more and better conversation. If there are indeed many 
salient distinctions between public and private, some of which have analogues within the law 
while others extend far beyond it, then attending to and interrogating these various 
distinctions is surely worthwhile. Only that will allow us to see the true complexity of our 
situation. Our thinking about public and private manifests a range of sometimes related and 
intersecting, sometimes divergent and discontinuous issues and we ought not to be surprised 
when this complexity is inscribed in various practices and social-institutional forms. This 
messy reality is not, however, immediately visible. It becomes clear only when we reject the 
urge to regard all that we see and think about public and private as manifestations of a single, 
ostensibly simple, issue. 
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